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I. PERPLEXING CHANGES IN SECURITIES LAWS
For the past several decades, Congress and the Supreme Court have been fighting
a great tug of war over securities fraud litigation, particularly claims made under Section
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10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed
into law the Accounting Reform and Investment Protection Act, more commonly known
as Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), and set the stage for the latest battle in the securities-litigation
tug of war.2
Financial scandals involving WorldCom, Qwest, Tyco, and Enron eventually cost
shareholders around $460 billion.3 After the devastating collapse of these corporate
giants, the government needed something to restore investor confidence in publicly
traded companies, and SOX was born.4 Introduced by Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes
of Maryland, the SOX Act and amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
created several mandatory changes in the operations of publicly traded companies.5
This Comment focuses specifically on changes SOX made with regard to
securities fraud litigation.6 One of these changes amended Title 28, Section 1658 of the
United States Code to establish a longer statute of limitations, as well as, a longer statute
of repose for securities fraud claims under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.7 Congress
extended the one year statute of limitations, applicable from the time of the discovery of
fraud, to two years and the three year statute of repose, applicable from the time of the
violation, to five years.8 The amendment, Section 804 of SOX, also noted the effective
date of the longer statutes of limitation and repose.9 Section 804(b) states it “shall apply

1

See generally Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (analyzing a
violation of the constitutional separation of powers created by the enactment of section
27A the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2236
(1991)).
2
15 U.S.C § 7201 (2002).
3
John Paul Lucci, Enron--TheBankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International
Ricochet of Sarbanes - Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 212 (2003).
4
See Bruce Vanyo, Stuart Kagan & John Classen, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A
Securities Litigation Perspective, 1332 PLI/Corp 89, 120 (2002).
5
See id. at 94 (“The Act fundamentally alters oversight of public company accounting. It
institutes a host of new criminal and civil penalties against companies and management
centered on proper accounting. The Act alters the way companies manage their
documents”).
6
See discussion infra Parts II, III, IV, V, VI.
7
See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 289 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1147 (2003). Section 10(b)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
or any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
8
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2005).
9
Id.
3

to all proceedings addressed by this section that are commenced on or after the date of
enactment of this act.”10 Immediately, investors filed claims previously time barred
before the introduction of SOX, and a handful of courts were forced to decide whether
these claims could be heard.11
The question of whether an amended statute of limitations revives previously
time-barred claims is not a new issue in securities fraud litigation.12 The issue has
volleyed between Congress and the judiciary in a kind of legal tennis match for the past
few decades.13 The question of retroactivity with reference to SOX presents much
confusion.14 Due to political pressures, the SOX legislation flew through Congress.15
The Act has been criticized as hastily passed and poorly drafted.16 It is an open question
whether SOX applies retroactively.17 It was written imperfectly and subject to what has
been considerable litigation.18 “Even if a longer statute of limitations period is warranted
. . . [i]t is inconsistent with express statutes of limitation already contained in the federal
securities laws and is likely to create significant interpretational difficulties for courts.”19
The first two courts to decide if the extended statute of limitations revived
previously time-barred claims held in opposite manners.20 More claims came forward to
press the issue, but the few courts that addressed it found themselves mired in confusion

A period of limitations bars an action if the plaintiff does not file suit within a set period
of time from the date on which the cause of action accrued. In contrast, a period of repose
bars a suit a fixed number of years after an action by the defendant.

Quakk v. Dexia, 357 F.Supp.2d 330, 337 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Beard v. J.I.
Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1097 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987)).
10
Pub. L. No.107-204, § 804(b), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1658).
11
See In re Heritage, 89 F. Supp.2d at 1132.
12
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 211 (1995).
13
See generally id. (analyzing a violation of the constitutional separation of powers
created by the enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991)).
14
Michael A. Perino, Statute of Limitations Under the Newly Passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
N.Y.L.J at 4, Aug. 2, 2002.
15
See Vanyo, supra note 4, at 120.
16
Perino, supra note 14 at 4.
17
Richard B. Schmitt, Michael Schroeder & Shailagh Murray, Corporate Oversight Bill
Passes, Eases Path for Investor Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at A1.
18
Id.
19
Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence
Aspects of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 693 (2002).
20
Compare In re Heritage Bond Litig., 289 F.Supp 2d 1132, 1148 (“[The amended
statute of limitations] cannot apply to claims already barred at the time of its enactment,
regardless of the filing date.”) and Roberts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 2003 WL
1936116 at 3 (M.D.Fla.) (“The section by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases
filed after the effective date of the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct
occurred”).
4

due to the language of the Act.21 Guided by a test the Supreme Court developed in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, courts across the country worked to determine if the
statute applied retroactively.22
This Comment clarifies the issues presented by the SOX statute of limitations and
analyzes the current case law on the subject.23 Part II of this Comment provides a
historical background to securities fraud legislation and litigation and endeavors to shed
light on the back and forth play between the legislature and judiciary involving securities
fraud claims, specifically claims made under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.24 Part III introduces and examines the existing method used to determine
when retroactive application is permissible.25 Part IV explores the effect of the current
methodology when applied to the SOX statute of limitations by surveying the existing
case law on the subject, and Part V carries this analysis to its logical conclusion by
presenting arguments in favor of retroactive application.26 Finally, and foremost, the Act
remains highly significant and holds many future implications for the courts, including
the U.S. Supreme Court.27 For the reasons set forth below, the courts should hold in
favor of retroactive application and mend the holes their peers have worn into SOX
through improper use.28
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 10(B) SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Congress responded several decades ago to the stock market crash of 1929 by
enacting the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 much the same way they
responded to the devastating collapse of Enron and WorldCom by enacting SOX.29
21

Compare Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F.Supp.2d 957, 976 (2003) (holding a claim
filed after the effective date adding a party to a time-barred claim filed before the
effective date of the Act called for the application of the amended statute of limitations)
and Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 303 F.Supp 2d 724, 734 (2003) (holding the statute of
limitations applied to actions that may have accrued, but not actions that were previously
time barred).
22
A.I.G. Asian Infrastructure Fund, L.P. v. Chase Manhattan Asia, Ltd., J.P., 2004 WL
3095844 (S.D.N.Y.); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F.Supp.2d 334,
334 (2004) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)).
23
See discussion infra Parts II - VI.
24
See discussion infra Part II.
25
See discussion infra Part III.
26
See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
27
See discussion infra Part V-VI.
28
See discussion infra Part VI.
29
Compare Lucci, supra note 3, at 212 (describing the financial concerns that triggered
the enactment of SOX), and Peter J. McCarthy, The Constitutionality of Section 27A of
the Securities and Exchange At of 1934: Congressional Response to the Upheaval of the
Lampf decision, 20 J. Legis. 235, 238 (1994) (describing the financial concerns which
triggered the enactment of the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934).
5

The 1929 crash in a large part occurred due to speculation associated with the value of
stock. Through various fraudulent schemes, the entire stock system, as it existed,
collapsed in 1929. To prevent another crash, Congress acted swiftly and enacted two
major regulatory acts in two years. The 1933 Act regulates the actions of corporations
who issue stock. The 1934 Act is primarily concerned with regulating secondary resellers
and requiring corporations to file periodic reports as to the condition and financial future
of their corporations.30

Section 804(b) of SOX addresses claims made under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.31
Significant debate exists as to whether the extended statute of limitations also applies to
Sections 11 and 12(a) of the 1933 Act.32
This Comment primarily focuses on claims made under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33 Section 10(b) addresses securities fraud claims
brought about due to the employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.34 Section
10(b) does not include a statute of limitations because Congress did not originally intend
the rule to allow for private suits.35 Courts interpreting Section 10(b) established an
implied cause of action authorizing private litigants to pursue individual claims against
companies who engage in acts that contravene Section 10(b).36
In the absence of an express statute of limitations for federal law claims, courts
utilize the traditional practice of borrowing the law of the forum state to supply a statute
of limitations period.37 During 1980s, numerous insider trading scandals led to classaction lawsuits and multidistrict Section 10(b) claims.38 The question of which state’s
statute of limitations to apply presented a complex problem, and the time came for the
Supreme Court to clarify the issue.39
30

McCarthy, supra note 29, at 238.
Compare Perino, supra note 14, at 4 (arguing that Section 804(b) of SOX may apply to
claims under Sections 11 and 12(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 because a number of
courts have found that claims brought under these sections “sound in fraud”), and John C.
Coffee, Jr., A Brief Tour of the Major Reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SH097 ALIABA 151, 174 (2002) (arguing that Section 804(b) of SOX does not apply to claims
brought under Sections 11 and 12(a) because claims brought under these sections do not
involve fraud, but rather a lesser claim of material nondisclosure).
32
Perino, supra note 14, at 4.
33
See discussion infra Parts III - VI.
34
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
35
McCarthy, supra note 29, at 239.
36
McCarthy, supra note 29, at 239. In Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp 798
(E.D. Pa. 1947), a federal court ruled that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contained
an implied right of action under Section 10(b). Joseph F. Morrissy, Catching The
Culprits: Is Sarbanes – Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 810 (2003).
37
McCarthy, supra note 29, at 239 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395
(1946)).
38
McCarthy, supra note 29, at 239.
39
McCarthy, supra note 29, at 240; See also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 352 (1991) (holding that state-borrowing principles should
be applied to causes of action implied under a statute which also contains an express
cause of action with an analogous statute of limitations).
31
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B. The Supreme Court Sets a Uniform Statute of Limitations: Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson
1. Statutes of Limitations and Repose
Due to conflicting opinions among the Circuits and the complicated problem of
choosing the proper limitations period for Section 10(b) securities fraud claims, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the important issue in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Purpis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson (Lampf), a case arising out of the Ninth Circuit.40
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the court in which Justices Rehnquist, White,
Marshall, and Scalia joined.41 Relying on precedent, the Court employed a hierarchical
inquiry to ascertain the appropriate limitations period for Section 10(b) claims.42
The inquiry applied by the Court requires three separate determinations.43 First,
the Court must determine whether the federal cause of action tends to encompass various,
diverse topics and subtopics making it impossible to consistently apply one statute of
limitations period within a jurisdiction.44 Second, assuming a standardized limitations
period was suitable, the Court must determine whether a state or federal source should
provide this period.45 Finally, keeping in mind that a presumption exists in favor of state
borrowing, the Court must determine if there is an analogous federal source that affords a
“closer fit” with the cause of action at issue than any state-law source.46 The Court
proceeded to apply the hierarchical inquiry to the Section 10(b) claim in question.47
In analyzing the claim before it, the Court determined with regard to the first
question of the hierarchical inquiry that the use of differing state statutes would present
the danger of forum shopping, and the interests of predictability and judicial economy
called for the adoption of one, consistent source.48 Answering the second and third
questions of the hierarchical inquiry, the Court “conclude[d] that where, as here, the
claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of action
with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain
the proper limitations period.”49 The statute of origin for Section 10(b) securities fraud
claims is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.50
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 encompasses various provisions outlining
multiple causes of action with differing statutes of limitation.51 The Solicitor General, in
40

Lampf, 501 U.S. at 354.
Id. at 351.
42
Id. at 356.
43
Id. at 357.
44
Id. (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273 (1945)).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 359.
48
See id. at 357.
49
Id. at 359.
50
Id. at 359-60.
51
Jon B. Streeter & Peter E. Root, An Overview of the Civil Liability Provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in PRACTISING LAW
41
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an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission urged
the Court to apply the five-year statute of repose incorporated into Section 20A of the Act
by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.52 The Court
disagreed with the Commission and determined instead that Section 9 of the Act
pertaining to willful manipulation of securities prices was sufficiently analogous and
more appropriately applied to Section 10(b) claims.53 Section 9 of the Act states: “No
action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless
brought one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three
years after such violation.”54 The Securities and Exchange Commission argued the
adoption of the three year period of repose would frustrate the purpose of Section 10(b).55
The Court, however, asserted that the inclusion of the one- and three-year arrangement in
the broad collection of express securities actions included in the 1933 and 1934 Acts
supports a congressional decision that the three-year period is adequate.56 Claims made
pursuant to Section 10(b) must therefore be initiated within one year of discovery and
within three years after such violation.57
2. Retroactive Application
Apart from establishing statutes of limitation and repose for Section 10(b)
securities fraud claims, Lampf produced substantial controversy by announcing without
any analysis that these new statutes were to be applied retroactively to bar claims pending
at the time of the decision.58 The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals regarding the particular Section 10(b) claim presented in Lampf.59 While
timely under Ninth Circuit authority, the respondents’ claim was dismissed due to the
statutes introduced by the Court upon review.60 Justice O’Connor sharply criticized this
result in her dissent stating: “In holding that respondents’ suit is time barred under a
limitations period that did not exist before today, the Court departs drastically from our
established practice and inflicts an injustice on the respondents.”61 She argued precedent
clearly and accurately demonstrated the case was not time-barred.62
INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (No. B4-7094),
at 460 (1995).
52
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355.
53
Id. at 360.
54
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2005)).
55
Id. at 362. The principle purposes of Section 10(b) include combating fraud and
protecting investors. John L. Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and Section 10(b):
In Defense of the Common Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 777 (1982).
56
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 362 (citing Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 329, 363 (2d
Cir. 1990).
57
Id. at 364.
58
See McCarthy, supra note 29, at 240.
59
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
62
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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In her dissent, Justice O’Connor cited several cases to support her argument
including Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.63 In Chevron, the Court employed a method known
as pure prospectivity.64 According to the pure prospectivity methodology, “[t]he case is
decided under the old law but becomes a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with
respect to all conduct or events occurring after the date of that decision.”65 Chevron also
outlined three factors to consider when dealing with the non-retroactivity question: (1)
Does the decision overrule clear past precedent, (2) does it retard the effect or purpose of
the rule, and (3) does it produce substantial inequitable results?66 Applying the Chevron
factors, Justice O’Connor reasoned; first, the Court overrules plainly established circuit
precedent.67 Second, the Court makes clear that the federal interest in predictability
requires a uniform standard, but to retroactively apply a statute of limitations period that
the respondents could not have anticipated lacks predictability.68 Third, inequitable
results are obvious.69 She condemned the fact that the Court chose to ignore the
retroactivity issue, thereby unfairly burdening the respondents.70
The same day the Supreme Court announced its decision in Lampf, the Court also
announced its decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.71 In a plurality
opinion, the Court held in Beam that once the Court has applied a new rule of law to
litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural
requirements or res judicata.72 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia advanced the
notion that the pure prospective methodology of Chevron was unconstitutional in the
sense that it amounted to an advisory opinion, and that the concept of judicial review
constrained the Court to consider only the case that was actually before it.73 Though
Beam was not relied upon by the majority in Lampf, several circuits later held Beam
mandated retroactive application of the Lampf statutes of limitation and repose to Section
10(b) securities fraud claims.74

63

Id. at 373 (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
64
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536 (1991).
65
Id. (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 97 (1971)).
66
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106.
67
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 373 (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 97) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
68
Id. (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 97) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
69
Id. (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 97) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
70
Id. at 374 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
71
Compare id. at 350 (announcing the Supreme Court’s holding on June 20, 1991), and
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia , 501 U.S. 529, 529 (announcing the Supreme
Court’s holding on June 20, 1991).
72
Beam, 501 U.S. at 544.
73
Id. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring opinion).
74
McCarthy, supra note 29, at 244 (stating that the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
held Beam mandated retroactive application of the Lampf statutes of limitation).
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C. Congressional Response to Lampf
1. Statutes of Limitations and Repose
The Supreme Court holding in Lampf resulted in the dismissal of numerous
private Section 10(b) actions against the ringleaders of major financial scandals including
Charles Keeting, Michael Milken, and others.75 Congress and the SEC believed these
dismissals would negatively affect the enforcement process.76 SEC chairman Richard
Breeden endorsed a Senate bill that would overturn the Lampf decision and allow
litigants more time to bring Section 10(b) claims in U.S. courts.77 Breeden stated in a
public address: “The Commission shares the concern of Justice [Anthony] Kennedy in his
dissent [in Lampf] that an overly stringent statue of limitations may undermine investors’
ability to recover damages for fraud under the Act.”78 Congress soon began to churn out
new legislation with the hope of purging the devastating effects of Lampf.79
Democratic Senator Richard Bryan of Nevada introduced a bill that proposed a
two-year statute of limitations and five-year statute of repose applicable to all judicially
implied rights of action under the federal securities law.80 Despite the call to action from
individual members of the Senate and the SEC, Congress failed to reach a conclusive
agreement and instead resolved the issue by creating a provision that overturned the
Lampf decision.81 The provision eventually passed as Section 476 of the Deposit
Insurance Reform and Tax Payer Protection Act of 1991 and later became Section 27A of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82
2. Retroactive Application
Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act, signed into law by President George
H.W. Bush on December 19, 1991, eliminated the retroactive effect of the Lampf
decision.83 The pertinent part of Section 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(b), entitled effect on
dismissed causes of action, provides:
Any private civil action implied under 78j(b) of this title [§ 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934] that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991- (1) which was
dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and (2) which would have been
timely filed under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the
jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991,
75

McCarthy, supra note 29, at 246 n. 110 (quoting 137 CONG. REC. H11, 811 (daily ed.
Nov. 26, 1991) (Statement of Rep. Dingell)).
76
McCarthy, supra note 29, at 247.
77
23 Sec. Reg. & L.Rep. (BNA) 1141 (July 26, 1991).
78
Id.
79
See id.
80
Id.
81
Erica Gann, Judicial Action in Retrograde: The Case for Applying Section 804 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to All Fraud Actions under the Securities Laws, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
1043, 1053 (2004).
82
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
83
See id.
10

shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after December 19,
1991.84

Soon after Section 27A was signed into law, several litigants previously turned away due
to the Lampf and Beam decisions filed motions to reinstate their previously dismissed
claims.85
D. The Supreme Court Fires Back: Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.
One of the many claims Section 27A(b) aimed to reinstate made its way to the
Supreme Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
as Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc..86 The district court originally found the petitioners’
claims untimely under the Lampf rule and dismissed them with prejudice.87 The
petitioners did not file an appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later.88 Upon
the enactment of Section 27A, petitioners filed a motion to reinstate.89 The motion met
the conditions set forth in the Act, and therefore, the court was required to grant it.90
Instead, the district court refused to reinstate the claim holding Section 27A(b) was
unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.91
After a lengthy historical analysis, Justice Scalia delivered the Court’s majority
opinion which held that Section 27A(b) violated the Constitution’s separation of
powers.92 Justice Scalia rationalized that when retroactive legislation necessitates the
application of new legislation to the final judgment of a formerly adjudicated case, it
essentially reverses a determination previously made, in the case.93 The decisions of
Article III courts “are final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties.”94 Justice Scalia
remarked upon the impudence of Congress in attempting to set aside final judgments by
stating: “Apart from the statute we review[ed] today, we know no instance in which
Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by
retroactive legislation. That prolonged reticence would be amazing if such interference
were not understood to be constitutionally proscribed.”95 Perhaps discouraged by the
decision in Plaut, Congress failed to act again regarding Section 10(b) securities fraud
claims until the passage of SOX in 2002.96
84

15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(b) (2005).
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 215.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 214.
88
Id. at 215.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 211.
93
Id. at 225 (quoting The Federalist No. 81, at 545).
94
Id. at 226 (quoting United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. 641, 647-48 (1875)).
95
Id. at 230.
96
See Gann, supra note 81, at 1054. It should be noted that in late December1995,
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) over a
veto by President Clinton. William S. Learch, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
1995 – 1 ½ Years Later, 1005 PLI/Corp 569 (1997). The act resulted in higher pleading
85
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E. Congress Tries Again: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
1. Statutes of Limitation and Repose
SOX, approved in response to the financial scandals predominantly embodied by
the collapse of Enron, is possibly one of the most illustrious and comprehensive pieces of
legislation passed in decades.97 The Act was passed in a near unanimous vote by
Congress, and President Bush quickly signed it into law calling it one of the “most farreaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.”98 Legislative history reveals that in addition to remedying corporate fraud,
Congress intended the Act to overrule the 5-4 Lampf decision that established one- and
three-year statutes of limitations and repose for Section 10(b) securities fraud claims.99
Section 804 of the Act sets out statutes of limitation and repose for “a private
right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws, as defined in
section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)).”100
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced Section 804 as part of Senate Bill 2010, the Corporate
and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act.101 The Section lengthens the judicially implied
one- and three-year statutory scheme stating: These actions “may be brought not later
than the earlier of— (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation;
or (2) 5 years after such violation.”102 The justification offered for lengthening the statute
of limitations was that an extended period would allow defrauded investors a better
opportunity to recover losses in cases where those responsible for the fraud concealed
it.103

standards, automatic discovery, damage limitations, and a host of other procedural
safeguards to prevent excessive securities fraud claims. Id. Most experts contend the
presumption against retroactivity applies in the case of the PSLRA because the language
of the act states: “The amendments made by title shall not affect or apply to any private
action . . . commenced before and pending on [Dec. 22, 1995].” Id. (quoting Pub. L. No.
104-67, §108, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995)).
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Court decision … the current ‘one and three’ limitations period makes securities fraud
actions ‘all but a dead letter for injured investors who by no conceivable standard of
fairness or practicality can be expected to file suit within three years after the violation
occurred.
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2. Retroactive Application
The following passages explore the controversy surrounding the question of
retroactive application of the extended statute of limitations to Section 10(b) securities
fraud claims.104 SOX passed swiftly and contained vital provisions added by floor
amendments without hearings.105 Many experts predicted that the Act would house
several ambiguities and give way to unintended consequences.106 Controversy developed
around the following issues including, among other things, the introduction of
professional standards for attorneys and the statute of limitations.107 Recently, even one
of the sponsors of the Act, Congressman Michael Oxley, commented that it was an
imperfect document because it was hurried through in the “hothouse atmosphere”
following the demise of WorldCom.108 The speed with which the “corporate
responsibility bill juggernaut”109 raced through Congress did not bode well for future
litigation.110
In a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1658, Section 804(b) of SOX established an effective
date for the extended statute of limitations.111 The note reads, “the limitations period
provided by section 1658(b) of title 28, United States Code, as added by this section,
shall apply to all proceedings addressed by this section that are commenced on or after
the date of enactment of this Act [July 30, 2002].”112 Two distinct arguments arise due to
the wording of this section.113 Thus far, courts have almost consistently held that claims
previously time barred under the old statutory scheme were not revived by the new
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amended statutes.114 Others have argued, Congressional intent found in the legislative
history prescribes that the statute applies retroactively.115 Some courts dissect the issue
further claiming the language of the Act provides for limited retroactive application for
the earlier of two years after discovery of the fraud or five years after the fraudulent
conduct that occurred before enactment, emphasizing the importance of inquiry notice
and discovery.116 Clearly this presents a need for uniformity, but the pursuit of
uniformity must not be attempted at the expense of justice.
III. RETROACTIVE ANALYSIS
Before addressing the confusion presented by the wording of Section 804 of SOX,
it is proper to note that significant confusion exists in the concept of retroactivity in
general and what constitutes retroactive effect.117 Retroactivity is formally defined as
encompassing two distinct concepts.118 First, ‘true retroactivity’ entails the application of
a new law to an act or transaction which was completed prior to the enactment of the new
law.119 Second, ‘quasi-retroactivity’ arises when a new law is applied to an act or
transaction not yet completed at the time of enactment.120 The following passages and
the cases which analyze the issue explore the concept of true retroactivity with respect to
Section 804 of SOX.121
Congress may constitutionally apply an extended statute of limitations period
retroactively122 In fact, Congress may even enact a new statute of limitations to revive
claims barred under a prior rule.123 But while Congress has this power, it must
unambiguously state that the law applies retroactively.124 The majority of courts
determining the issue of retroactivity with respect to the statute of limitations amended by
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SOX applied a “three-step analysis” developed by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI
Film Products.125
A. The Three-Step Analysis: Landgraf v. USI Film Products
When a case involves a federal statute enacted following the incident in the suit,
the Court introduced a three-step analysis in Landgraf for making a conclusion as to
retroactivity (the three-step analysis).126 First, a court must determine whether Congress
has expressly provided for the statute’s proper reach.127 In Landgraf, the Court found the
words “pending on or commenced after the date of enactment” to be a clear expression of
Congressional intent for the statute to apply retroactively.128 If Congress has done so, a
court need not resort to the judicial default rules.129 Second, if the statute contains no
explicit rule, a court must resolve whether the new statute would have retroactive
effect.130 Several courts have described the second step of the three-step analysis “as an
inquiry into whether the statutory change affects substantive or procedural rights.”131
Retroactive effect occurs when a newly enacted statute either, impairs the rights a party
possessed when he acted, enhances a party’s liability for past acts, or imposes new
obligations with regard to transactions already completed.132 Third, if the statute imposes
retroactive effects, traditional presumptions dictate it does not apply absent clear
congressional intent.133
Landgraf involved a sexual harassment challenge under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.134 Petitioner Barbara Landgraf claimed that while employed at a USI
Film Products plant in Tyler, Texas, she suffered repeated harassment due to
inappropriate remarks made by a fellow employee.135 The district court dismissed the
claim finding that Landgraf’s employer had adequately remedied the situation.136 While
Landgraf awaited appeal, the President signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law.137
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act contained provisions establishing a right to obtain
compensatory and punitive damages for a violation of Title VII and allowed for a jury
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trial if these types of damages were asserted.138 After introducing the above multipart
test and analyzing the language of the Act accordingly, the Court determined the
provisions of the new act did not apply retroactively to Landgraf’s claim because
Congress did not expressly prescribe retroactive application of Section 102.139
B. Working the Steps
The first step of the analysis seems rather straightforward, but courts differ in
exactly what type of language expressly prescribes a statute’s proper reach.140 The
statutory language at issue in Landgraf consisted of the following: “Except as otherwise
specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect
upon enactment.”141 The Court found this language lacked the kind of unambiguous
directive required to permit retroactive application and thus, turned to an analysis of the
legislative history to ascertain congressional intent.142 Congress originally attempted to
pass the Act in 1990.143 The language of the 1990 Act contained an express provision for
retroactivity144 The President vetoed the 1990 legislation, referring to the bill’s “unfair
retroactivity rules” as a basis for his disapproval.145 Congress failed to override the veto,
and instead introduced the 1991 legislation without the provision for retroactivity.146
The fact that such language was noticeably absent from the 1991 Act cannot reasonably
be attributed to ignorance of the retroactivity issue.147 Rather, it appears more evident
that the absence of the retroactive language resulted from a compromise that made it
possible to enact the 1991 version.148 Thus, one may argue the existence of clear
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congressional intent against retroactive application of the Act, but the Court pushed on to
the second step in the analysis.149
When turning to the second step in the three-step analysis, the Court advanced the
notion that there is a deeply rooted presumption against retroactive legislation.150 This
deeply rooted presumption against statutory retroactivity developed due to the perceived
unfairness implicit when imposing new burdens on parties after the fact.151 In actuality, a
contrary rule existed in common law that called for retroactive application of statutes that
removed a burden from the parties.152 The presumption against retroactivity conflicts
with another well known axiom that the “court is to apply the law in effect at the time it
renders its opinion.”153 If the Court applied this latter principle in Landgraf, the Act
would apply retroactively to the claim.154 Courts commonly find “apparent tension”
amid differing canons of statutory construction.155 Therefore, courts must determine if
applying the statute retroactively leads to impermissible consequences.156
Impermissible consequences are found in every statute which impairs vested
rights obtained under existing laws, or imposes a new duty or disability with respect to
transactions which have already taken place.157 The Court must ask whether the Act
attaches new legal consequences to events that occurred prior to its enactment, but even
the potential unfairness of applying civil legislation retroactively does not justify the
Court’s failure to give the statute its intended scope.158 The Court in Landgraf
determined that the provisions for punitive and compensatory damages set forth in the
new Civil Rights Act, if applied retroactively, would impose a new disability and attach
new legal burdens to conduct that occurred before the Act became effective.159 These
impermissible effects led the Court to hold that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not
operate retroactively, and therefore, according to the third step of the analysis it did not
govern petitioner Landgraf’s claim due to the absence of clear congressional intent.160
Justice Blackmun found much at fault with the reasoning of the majority, and in
his dissent, he argued the decision “extends the presumption against retroactivity beyond
its historical reach and purpose.”161 Justice Blackmun believed the most natural reading
of the statute and a straightforward textual analysis of the Act indicated that the
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provisions of Section 102 applied to cases pending on appeal at the time of enactment.162
He too advanced a traditional canon of construction: “[T]he starting point for
interpretation of a statute, is the language of the statute itself.”163
IV. RETROACTIVITY AND SOX: AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING CASE LAW
President Bush signed the SOX into law in the congressional election year of
2002.164 Accused as sluggish in his response to financial scandals and motivated by
plunging stock prices and concerns voters would hold him and fellow republicans
accountable, many democrats pointed out that the President had been corralled into
supporting the Act.165 At the signing, the President remarked that “tricking an investor
into taking a risk is theft by another name.”166 Many wondered, including Senator Tom
Daschle, Democratic majority leader, why then had the Justice Department, as of yet,
failed to indict executives at Enron nearly eight months after the corporation’s
bankruptcy.167 Would private individuals likely wait as long to file civil claims, and if so,
would the extended statute of limitations increase their chances of recovery? To which
claims does the amended statute apply? Litigation over the scope of the new section was
certain.168 The United States District Court for the Central District of California issued
the first opinion on the matter of retroactive application on January 6, 2003.169
A. Out of the Starting Gates: In re Heritage Bond Litigation
In re Heritage Bond Litigation involved an action against various defendants for
making false and misleading statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.170 Heritage Entities issued twelve bond offerings between the
years of 1997 and 1999 for the purported purpose of establishing and maintaining
Alzheimer’s healthcare facilities, and as reflected in the Official Statement, the funds
received from the sale of the bonds to investors were restricted solely to this purpose.171
Instead, Heritage Entities, contrary to the terms of the Official Statements, shifted the
proceeds of the bond offerings between several projects commingling and siphoning off
the funds during transfer.172 The projects themselves were not self-sustaining but instead
kept afloat with the money earned from new offerings.173 By 2002, the entire scheme
162
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collapsed and Heritage defaulted on the repayment of the bonds defrauding investors of
nearly $25 million.174
Plaintiffs filed the Section 10(b) claim prior to the passage of SOX, but then refilled an essentially identical claim, after the President signed the Act into law.175 The
court began the task of interpreting which claims fell within the scope of the amended
statute of limitations, remarking that the issue had not yet been addressed by the courts.176
Without mentioning the three-step analysis established by Landgraf, or analyzing the
effect of the Act on a claim not previously filed, the court quoted Chenault v. United
States Postal Service, a Ninth Circuit decision, in holding that a newly enacted statute of
limitations may not be applied retroactively to revive previously time-barred claims.177
The plaintiffs’ claim in Heritage expired according to the old three year statutory period
before the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley.178
B. Retroactivity Lives: Roberts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
Of the first cases to determine the issue of retroactivity with respect to Section
10(b) securities fraud claims, Roberts v. Dean Witter, remains one of the few to favor
retroactive application.179 In Roberts, the defendant, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, filed a
motion to dismiss due to the fact that the underlying fraud occurred in 1998 and the
plaintiffs would have been barred from asserting the claim under the prior statutory
scheme.180 The plaintiffs argued the language of the Act was unambiguous and
legislative history supported their contention that Congress meant the Act to apply
retroactively.181 The court, first looking to statute itself, concluded the language of the
Act, standing alone, afforded redress for violations occurring before the date of
enactment.182 But noting that Congress did not specifically use the phrase retroactive
application in the statute, the court turned next to examine the legislative history
surrounding the passage of the Act.183 The legislative history lent much credibility to the
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plaintiffs’ argument.184 The court focused on one particular statement by Senator Patrick
Leahy: “[S]ection [804], by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases filed after the
effective date of the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.”185 The
court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss but granted an interlocutory appeal to
determine the controlling question of law—whether SOX revives time barred claims.186
C. The Presumption Against Retroactivity Finds Overwhelming Support
As of the date of this Comment, no United States district court has held that SOX
revives previously time-barred Section 10(b) securities fraud claims, and the federal
circuit courts seem to be heading in the same direction.187 The circuits that have decided
the issue applied the three-step analysis and found an absence of clear congressional
intent in the language of the Act.188 The Second Circuit rendered the first appellate
decision on the issue in In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co..189 The Seventh and
Eighth Circuits followed closely behind in their decisions in Foss v. Bear Stearns & Co.
and In re ADC Telecommunications, Inc., respectively.190
1. The Second Circuit: In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co.
The appeal to the Second Circuit in Enterprise Mortgage involved cases arising
from two different district courts.191 The circuit court did not formerly consolidate the
cases for appeal but heard them on the same day and resolved them together due to the
substantially identical issues.192 The cases involved Section 10(b) claims for allegedly
misleading financial statements and private placements.193 In both instances, the
plaintiffs filed prior to the passage of SOX but following the enactment, appended
additional claims and joined an additional defendant to take advantage of the extended
statute of limitations.194
In applying the first step of the three-step analysis, the court concluded that the
statute lacked the type of unambiguous language the Supreme Court has held would
amount to an express retroactivity command.195 The statute failed to use the terms
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“retroactive” or “revive.”196 The court also analyzed the wording of Section 804(c)
which states: “Nothing in this section shall create a new, private right of action.”197
While admitting that the plaintiffs’ argument that Section 804(c) was merely an
expression that the statute of limitations was being enlarged without creating new types
of claims was plausible, the court nevertheless concluded both the section setting forth
the effective date, Section 804(b), and the section prohibiting the creation of new actions,
Section 804(c) lacked clarity.198 The court stated that “[t]he requirement of congressional
clarity . . . must be met both in order to overcome the presumption against retroactive
application and to obviate the need for proceeding to the second stage of the three-step
[analysis].”199 The plaintiffs continued to argue the second step of the three-step
analysis, whether the statutory changes operated with retroactive effect, despite this
determination by the court.200
In arguing the second step of the three-step analysis, the plaintiffs took the
position that the extension of a federal statute of limitations is both procedural in nature
and retroactive.201 Relying on Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Central School District, the
plaintiffs asserted that retroactivity concerns generally do not bar the application of an
extended statute of limitations.202 Vernon concerned a claim brought under the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA).203 Congress amended the statute of
limitations applicable to filing a claim under the ADEA subsequent to the filing of the
claim at issue.204 The court in Vernon, relying heavily on Landgraf, determined the
statute applied retroactively because the statute of limitations applied not to the primary
conduct of the defendants, but instead, to the secondary conduct of the plaintiffs in filing
the suit.205 The statute when applied retroactively impaired no rights possessed by either
party.206 The court in Enterprise Mortgage disregarded this argument finding that a
statute of limitations can be substantive or procedural in nature and refused to create a
categorical exception to Landgraf.207 The court considered the plaintiffs’ failure to prove
clear congressional intent in the first step of the analysis fatal to their appeal.208 The
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SOX amended statute of limitations would not revive previously time-barred claims filed
in the Second Circuit.209
2. The Seventh Circuit: Foss v. Bear Sterns & Co.
The appeal to the Seventh Circuit in Foss involved a Section 10(b) claim against a
securities broker for allegedly aiding and abetting the fraudulent concealment of an
estate’s securities committed by the administrator in probate court.210 The court in Foss
refused to analyze the retroactivity issue presented and merely remarked that the
reasoning contained in the Enterprise Mortgage decision was persuasive.211 Relying
solely on the decision issued by the Second Circuit in Enterprise Mortgage, the Seventh
Circuit held that the extended statute of limitations did not revive previously time-barred
Section 10(b) securities fraud claims.212
3. The Eighth Circuit: In re ADC Telecommunications Co.
The appeal the Eighth Circuit in ADC involved a Section 10(b) claim alleging
false and misleading statements made during the purchase of ADC stock.213 The
Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint following the passage of SOX, but both parties agreed
that the cause of action accrued in the months prior to the enactment, making it timebarred under the old one- and three-year statutory scheme.214 The court began the task of
working through the three-step analysis, only after recognizing the deeply rooted
presumption against retroactivity stating: “[E]lementary considerations of fairness dictate
that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their
conduct accordingly.”215
In the first step of the analysis, the court found that while the language in Section
804(b) of SOX was similar to the language endorsed by the Supreme Court as an explicit
retroactivity command in Landgraf, Congress failed to include the words “pending on”
found in the Landgraf statute.216 The court reasoned that a literal reading of the Act
would permit a puzzling result, allowing the revival of stale claims filed after the passage
of SOX while barring stale claims filed prior to the date of enactment.217 The fear of this
result led the court to conclude the language created ambiguity as to the retroactive
application of SOX.218
Next, advancing to the second step of the three-step analysis, the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the decisions in Chenault and the Second Circuit in Enterprise Mortgage
209
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holding that allowing the amended statute to revive stale claims would alter the
substantive rights of a party.219 Three circuit courts now found the extended statute of
limitations established by SOX failed to revive previously time-barred claims.220 These
results seemed to indicate a growing consensus on the issue until the Eleventh Circuit, in
a recently rendered opinion, indicated that it might permit the revival of stale claims.221
D. Retroactivity Reborn in the Eleventh Circuit: Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
The interlocutory appeal granted in Roberts moved to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit as Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. for the sole purpose of
determining if the amended statute of limitations in SOX revived previously time-barred
Section 10(b) securities fraud claims.222 The plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in
November of 2002, following the passage of SOX, alleging that defendant Dean Witter
deceptively contrived market prices of a certain stock by engaging in a short squeeze to
maintain artificially high prices.223 The fraud occurred in 1998 making the action time
barred under the original one-and three- year statute of limitations established by
Lampf.224 The court of appeals reviewed de novo analyzing the issue according to the
three-step analysis.225
In applying the first step of the three-step analysis, the court determined that
under a plain, facial reading of the Act, “there is built-in, limited retroactive application
for the earlier of two years after discovery of the facts constituting securities fraud or five
years after the fraudulent securities conduct that occurred prior to its enactment.”226 The
court reviewed previous Supreme Court decisions that allowed the revival of expired
claims under new, extended statutes of limitation with analogous language.227 The Tello
court refused to attach any significance to the to absence of the word pending that the
Eighth Circuit found so persuasive and concluded that the temporal reach of the statute
inherently included fraud that occurred prior to enactment.228 They noted that the
219
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Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized that securities laws combating fraud should be
construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial
purpose.”229 Because the court deemed the temporal effect of the statute obvious from its
language, they did not advance to the second or third steps of the three-step analysis.230
The Tello court failed to issue a final opinion.231 Instead, it remanded the case to
the district court for a factual determination concerning when the plaintiffs had sufficient
inquiry notice to file their claim.232 The court explained that if the plaintiffs were
sufficiently on inquiry notice prior to the enactment of SOX, the claim would be time
barred under the old statutory scheme.233 The district court has yet to make the
determination, and the issue of whether the extended statutes of limitation established by
SOX revive previously time-barred claims awaits resolution.234
V. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
A. The Language of Section 804(b) Expresses Congressional Intent for Retroactivity
The first step in the three-step analysis instructs courts to determine whether
Congress expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.235 Section 804(b) of SOX states
that the new statute of limitations applies to “all proceedings commenced on or after the
date of enactment.”236 This statement amounts to a clear directive that the new
limitations period applies to any claim filed after the enactment of SOX regardless of
whether the claim was previously time barred.237 The Eighth Circuit implicitly agreed
that a literal reading of the statute would lead to such a result.238 It refused, though, to
apply the statute retroactively because it found this result puzzling.239 It concluded that
applying the statute according to its literal terms would lead to a discrepancy.240 Namely,
stale claims filed prior to enactment would not be revived, whereas claims filed on or
after the effective date would be revived.241 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that this
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discrepancy created the ambiguity and not the language of the statute itself.242 In fact, the
Eighth Circuit chose to ignore the language of the statute itself when it issued what
amounted to a policy decision in ADC.
1. A Misstep on the First Step
To begin with, the first step of the three-step analysis does not call for courts to
analyze the effects of the statutory language; rather, courts need only determine if
Congress expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.243 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court stated in Landgraf that: “[T]he potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is
not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope.”244 Not only
did the Eighth Circuit choose to ignore Section 804’s clear directive, it chose also to
ignore the proper application of the three-step analysis established by the Supreme
Court.245
Again, the first step of the three-step analysis requires courts to determine
whether Congress has expressly provided for the statute’s proper reach.246 The second
step inquires into retroactive effects, and finally, the third step, absent an express
Congressional provision and due to the presence of impermissible retroactive effects,
instructs that the judicial presumption against retroactivity applies.247 In other words, the
judicial default rules do not come into consideration until after the court has resolved the
first step of the three-step analysis.248 That determination must be made without
reference to the presumption.249 Many of the courts performing the three-step analysis
with respect to Section 804 failed determine whether the plain language of the statute
provided its proper reach before applying the judicial presumption against
retroactivity.250 The presence of the presumption during the analysis of the language
must certainly prejudice the logic and conclusion reached by the court.251 If the court
begins its analysis with a preconceived notion that it should find against retroactive
application, the court, due to that preconceived notion, holds the language to a stricter
standard. Perhaps this explains the faulty conclusion reached by the Eighth Circuit in
ADC.
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2. Similar Language Leads to Similar Results
Looking to prior decisions, the Supreme Court and two United States courts of
appeals have previously held that language similar to the language found in Section
804(b) not only applies retroactively to conduct occurring pre-enactment, but also revives
claims previously time barred.252 These decisions involved statutes similar to Section
804(b) that failed to use the terms “retroactive” and “revive,” but nevertheless, they were
held to reinstate previously time-barred claims.253
For example, in International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc. (Robbins Meyers), the Supreme Court held the
language “charges pending . . . on the date of the enactment of this Act and all charges
filed thereafter” applied to all charges whether timely or not upon enactment.254 The
Court determined that the claim in Robbins Meyers, although untimely when filed, fell
under the definition of pending and within the scope of the amended statute of
limitations.255 They explained their reasoning with the statement: “[The] reading of
‘pending’ confining it to charges still before the Commission and timely when filed is not
the only possible meaning of the word.”256 In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that cases “filed and not yet rejected” were also encompassed by a logical
interpretation of the word pending.257 This acknowledgement leads one to the conclusion
that the use of the pending language is not imperative in finding Congressional intent for
retroactivity, and the absence of the word does not render the language of Section 804(b)
ambiguous.258
Moreover, refusing to apply the amended statute of limitations to time-barred
claims filed after the enactment of SOX directly contravenes the language of Section
804(b) that states it “shall apply to all proceedings . . . commenced on or after the date of
enactment.”259 Again, the potential unfairness of applying civil legislation retroactively
does not justify the Court’s failure to give the statute its intended scope.260 The
conclusion that Section 804(b) does not revive stale claims would force a rather strained
construction upon Congress’ words.261 Surely, Congress intended the expected
implications of the language it chose.262
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3. Saving Section (c)
Several of the courts which analyzed the retroactivity issue remarked on the
language contained in Section 804(c) of the Act which states: “Nothing in this section
shall create a new, private right of action.”263 Most of these courts concluded that
Section 804(c) precluded the revival of previously time-barred claims because that would
create a new right of action.264 The court in Enterprise Mortgage stated: “Where a
plaintiff is empowered by a new statute to bring a cause of action that previously had no
basis in law, a new cause of action has, in some sense of the word, been created.”265
Section 804(c), however, does not encompass the issue of retroactive application.266
Section 804(a) of SOX states that the new statute of limitations applies to claims
of “fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory
requirement concerning the securities laws.”267 The legislative history indicates that
“private right of action” refers only to rights of action expressly enacted by Congress or
implied by the courts.268 Senator Leahy observed, “[t]his provision states that it is not
meant to create any new private cause of action but only to govern all the already existing
private causes of action under the various federal securities laws that have been held to
support private causes of action.”269 There is no support for the courts’ decisions that
Section 804(c) operates to preclude the revival of claims.270 A literal interpretation of
Section 804 of SOX clearly defines the temporal reach of the statute to include claims
previously time barred under the old statutory scheme, and judicial precedent wholly
supports that result.271
B. The Legislative History of Section 804 Supports Retroactivity
The Supreme Court fully expected other courts to examine the legislative history
surrounding a statute in the first step of the three-step analysis set out in Landgraf.272
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The Landgraf Court scrutinized the legislative history surrounding the Civil Rights Act of
1991 before holding the amended statute applied retroactively.273 A great debate
surrounds the use of legislative history in the interpretation of statutes, “but judges may
legitimately consult materials like committee reports or floor statements in the search for
intent where the language [of a statute] is ambiguous.”274 The legislative history
surrounding Section 804 and SOX in general indicate Congress’ intent that the amended
statutes of limitation applied retroactively.275
The argument for retroactive application finds its chief support in the comments
of Senator Leahy.276 On the floor of the Senate, Senator Leahy stated with regard to
Section 804 of SOX that, “[t]his section, by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases
filed after the effective date of the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct
occurred”277 The language “any and all” reinforces the conclusion that Section 804(b)
shall apply to all proceeding filed after the enactment without exception.278 If Senator
Leahy contemplated an exception for previously time-barred claims, certainly he would
have said as much. The phrase “regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred”
plainly indicates that Congress intended the Section to apply to pre-enactment events.279
Nowhere in the legislative history does it suggest Congress meant to distinguish between
claims that had expired before the enactment and claims which had not yet expired upon
enactment.280 A plain, facial reading of Section 804 alone supports Congress’ intent that
the Act operates to revive previously time-barred claims, and the language of the statute
taken in concert with the legislative history further reinforces this argument.281
C. Further Support for Retroactive Application
Courts often look to traditional canons of construction to aid in the interpretation
of statutory language.282 One such canon provides that statutes which are remedial in
nature are to be liberally construed.283 In fact, in 1969, the Supreme Court held that the
language of Section 10(b) must be interpreted liberally in order to accomplish the “broad
anti-fraud purposes of the statute.”284 A second traditional canon provides that “to effect

273

See id.
Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and
Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
275
Brief, supra note 110, at 20.
276
Legislative History, supra note 255.
277
Legislative History, supra note 255 (emphasis added).
278
Brief, supra note 110, at 20.
279
Brief, supra note 110, at 20.
280
Brief, supra note 110, at 20.
281
See Brief, supra note 110, at 20.
282
See Karl, N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules
or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.REV. 395, 399 (1950).
283
See id.
284
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969).
274

28

its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text.”285 In U.S. v. Carlton, the
Supreme Court upheld Congress’ power to remove a tax deduction retroactively, even
when the tax-payer arranged his transactions in reliance upon the deduction.286 The
Carlton Court explained its reasoning rested in the fact that the holding was appropriate
to effectuate the purpose of the statute and achieve its curative effect.287 Taken together,
these two traditional canons of construction and prior case law permit the retroactive
application of Section 804. The legislative history states: “This legislation aims to
prevent and punish corporate and criminal fraud, protect the victims of such fraud,
preserve the evidence of such fraud, and hold wrongdoers accountable for their
actions.”288 The legislation clearly demonstrated a remedial nature. To effectuate the
remedial purpose of Section 804, courts must allow the revival of previously time-barred
claims in order to protect the victims of fraud and punish wrongdoers. Senator Leahy
stated, “[t]here ought to be some way for the people who lost their pensions, lost their life
savings, to get it back.”289 Allowing Section 804 of SOX to revive previously timebarred claims accomplishes that task.
One final argument in support of retroactive application of Section 804 rests in
the concept that the revival of time-barred claims does not operate to impose
impermissible retroactive effects. In his majority opinion in Robbins Meyers, Justice
Rehnquist stated “certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation
so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the
Fourteenth Amendment.”290 There are no vested rights in the running of a statute of
limitations to prevent a remedy.291 In his Landgraf dissent, Justice Blackmun stated:
“There is no vested right to do wrong.”292 One traditional argument against the
retroactive application of new legislation states that “[e]lementary considerations of
fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and
conform their conduct accordingly.”293 The Court in Carlton chose to ignore this
argument, instead finding that the inequitable results were rationally related to achieving
the legitimate remedial purpose and trumped any considerations of notice of the law.294
Even if impermissible retroactive effects presented themselves in the retroactive
application of Section 804, the impermissible effects would be justified in order to
achieve the remedial purpose of the statute. Obviously, the vast majority of courts
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handling the retroactivity issue insist upon ignoring or misapplying the proper three-step
analysis in favor of confusion and injustice.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the parties in Tello await a factual determination by the district court on the
issue of notice, interested parties everywhere await a possible holding by the Eleventh
Circuit allowing the retroactive application of Section 804 of SOX.295 Retroactivity is
not a new concept.296 Until a few decades ago, the established understanding was that
new legislation applied prospectively, and judicial decisions applied retroactively.297 The
Supreme Court’s decisions on retroactivity in the legislative context have wavered
between a flexible discretionary approach and a pragmatic adherence to judicial
presumptions against retroactive application.298 The modern Court has been consistently
deferential to the concept of legislative retroactivity perhaps due to the “erosion of the
doctrine of substantive due process.”299 The Court has yet to sufficiently clarify the issue
of legislative retroactivity, and it is likely to be the focus of numerous decisions yet to
come.300
The history of securities litigation in the United States illustrates the significance
of the retroactivity issue.301 Ever since the Supreme Court recognized an implied private
right of action under Section 10(b), the multiple branches of government have been
striving to establish the proper structure and scope of those claims.302 Very often, the
objectives of each work in opposition to each other.303 Power struggles and policy
consideration further frustrate any attempts for uniformity and simplicity.304 The
Supreme Court created a basic framework for retroactive analysis with its decision in
Landgraf, but courts continue to abuse and misapply it.305 Some courts choose to ignore
it altogether.306
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When SOX became effective in 2002, many experts anticipated the reemergence
of the retroactivity issue.307 The majority of decisions specifically concerning the SOX
extended statute of limitations demonstrate an unwillingness of the courts to allow
retroactivity.308 This unwillingness cannot stand alongside the language and purpose of
the Act, but the Eleventh Circuit remains the only court of appeals to recognize this
truth.309 While Tello signifies a step in the right direction, the tumultuous history of the
issue indicates many additional steps are required for resolution.310 Courts must permit
retroactive application of the SOX extended statutes of limitation in order to achieve the
Acts curative effect.
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